

SECRET

25 May 1961

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

☐ Retain class'n ☐ Change / classify to _____
☒ With concurrence of CIA
☒ Declassify ☐ In part and excise as shown
 EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (ACB-9-121-95)
 FPC/HDR by ACB-9-121-95
 Withdrawal No. 3-13
P. CLACK - BOCHANE 11/27/00

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Phillips Talbott

1. With reference to TOP SECRET cablegram No. 1280 to the American Embassy, Tehran, dated 24 May 1961, we have issued specific instructions to our Chief of Station, [] as follows:

a. On 17 May 1961, a message was sent to [] instructing him that, with the Ambassador's approval, he should take all steps necessary to discourage [] against initiating any action against the Amini Government.

b. On 22 May 1961, a further message was sent to [] advising him that the NSC had favorably considered the policy recommendations of the Iran Task Force; therefore, in any discussions he may have with [] or any other potential dissident military leaders, he should stress the U.S. Government position regarding the need to give fullest support to the Amini Government.

On 22 May, [] reported to us that on 20 May he informed [] in the strongest possible terms, of the U.S. Government policy of supporting the Amini government and the U.S. Government's intention to give Amini every opportunity to make a success of his government. In addition, [] reported that he unequivocally stated that not only would the U.S. Government consider a coup d'etat against the Amini government most unfortunate, but the U.S. Government would even take steps to prevent such a coup. Again, [] stated he is not planning to overthrow the government, and, in fact, he accepts and agrees, at least for the time being, that every effort should be made to help the Amini government succeed. [] in fact, agreed with the stated U.S. Government policy of support to the Amini government.

2. [] the U.S. Government had only three courses of action in Iran: a) support the Amini government completely; b) plan its own coup []; or c) to support [] in a coup which he planned to initiate without U.S. Government financial support. The Embassy in Tehran was informed that [] had made such an offer.

[] was instructed on 16 May to inform [] that:

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a. It is the firm policy of the U.S. Government to support the current government of Iran completely,

b. The U.S. Government has no desire to encourage activities directed at replacing the present government and, in fact, would strongly discourage such activities.

3. We are aware of your continued interest in this very important aspect of the situation in Iran and will keep you fully informed.



JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD

(b)(3)

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